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W The last couple of days have really set some procedural directions 
at leFst that wind up with an an inquirable effect and some future 
~pr~ssions.of those days. 




Maybe we had better work our way backwards hadn't we? That would 
be better. 
So maybe we can start - yeah - you'll date it. 
Thursday morning, June 27th because we had a bicentenial breakfast 
and I thought it was a pretty impressive show that John Rockefeller, III 
ut on as well as John Warner and it does make you think how we can 
not impeach the president in the light of all xkis the revelation 
as we enter into a bicenteilinial year - re-examine our situation which 
is the theory of the bicentennial to re--examine our situation and 
look for our prospects for the 3rd Century and horizons of 1 76 and 
things of that nature in the presence of an impeachment proceeding 
- if the impeachment proceeding is successful - strike that - if 
the impeachment proceeding proceeds to impeachment and trial and 
the President is removed, we would have to think what effect that 
would have on our bicentennial and conversely, if we convict 7 -
now 7 - and probably 1O,people in the inner circle of the White 
House and don't impeach the president, what are the impacts of 
that on the enduring values of American government and so I think 
it calls N!tX us up short for some kind of reexamination of the 
policy considerations in our impeachment right now. So that's one 
of the things that was going through my mind this morning. 
Turning back to the 26th - which was yesterday, Wednesday, we spent 
all day on the - an examination of the resolutions of the - an 
examination of a Eesolution or a motion to,directed to the calling 
of witnesses and we closed the meetings. We began by voting to 
close the meetings. The House rules provide that if we are, if we 
are going to undertake some examination of some evidence that would 
tend to defame or degrade an individual then we rave to go into 
Executive Session and our counsel advised us that that would be 
the situation and for that reason I didn't feel like we had any 
alternatives. The vote was 25-13 and I voted Aye. 
I 1 m influenced by Don Edwards 1 view of all of these Executive Sessions 
and questions necause I know him to be an extremely liberal but' 
fairminded and it seemed to me that we still got to protect the 
rights and interests of the people who are not directly involved in 
this thing. 
My principle reason for voting to close the meeting was thia fact 
but also f think it was perfectly clear that the Erlichman jury 
is being impaneled today - today on Wednesday - and that the rules, 
our rules of, our deal with the Judge who released a lot of this 
Grand Jury information, particularly the testimony of David Young, 
was to the effect that we wouldn 1 t jeorpardise that suit and the 
principle problem is a sudden surge of information immediately 
preceding the trial is bound to be prejudical and so that's what 
we had to adoid at all costs. That was my reason for vmting to 
close the meeting - my second reason for v0ting to close the meeting. 
I don 1 t think we had any real choice - but the closeness of the vote 
indicated - early in the day - indicated that the question of calling 
witnesses was shaping up into a partisan question. 
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Then the presentation by - of course the 
these resolutions is that they pass them 
way the Democrats :ix presenting 
around among all the others, pass 
them around as we go. S 
help 
gE:,ug $OJ :g,g over mere -----.... 
hornton's turn and I couldn't 
~d been mistreated by not being allowed to 
he presented it but he's a good snarf anct·he 
ut that's kinda the way they're 
We spent a good deal of time just giving everybody a chance to unload - give 
their views. It's remarkable how much was said considering we were in 
Executive Session but we went through it all. During the lunch break - I 
mean, during the lunch time, when we took our ~~xk break, I had an extensive 
conversation with Bill Hungate from Missouri. Hungate, it struck me that 
the strangest witness that we were calling, was Butterfield. I think I_got 
e view of it from Hun ate as we went along. He says that Butterfield is 
~~ the one guy that's there in t e i view o 
everything thatls comes in and goes on and he might give us a view of the 
policy. Hungate's analagy to the man that's examined a tree and said that 
.-lVIL.I..UVAthere's not enough here to build a house and he examined each of 400 trees 
in the forest and said there's no tree here big enough to build a house so 
hey didn't build a house. Well, of course, the forest is full of trees 
and all you do is take two trees. You relate that xl analagy to the 
cumulative effect of the misdeeds of the White House and you get some 
gattern as he calls it - a pattern of deniability - and that's what I 
hink they are trying to get out of Batterfield - basically the conspiracy 
on the part (or behalf) of White House employees to make sure that the 
President doesn't know all the nasty things they are doing. That's - and I 
think very well - I think that very well may be true. Now if that proves 
an impeachable offense I don't know unless the President somehow - they can 
connect it up somehow that the President lost it in that fashion. So - that's 
something to think about. 
While I was talking to Hungate - we chatted some little time - and then we 
sat down on the floor - and he went into this - and then Peter Rodino came 
down and sat down and we talked about much about the same thing. Now Rodino 
I think was upset because I had asked to be reco ized and t ized 
- an t recognize me and got somebody else and he thought 
that I was a little upset about it - which I was upset at myself for not 
keeping my - keeping my hand up as .i't were - but he went out of his way to spend 
little time and bring me up to date on this thing and we discussed schedule 
and target and I had to agree with him that I thought he was proceeding in 
the right way. My view of - but apparently they had an advisory committee 
meeting - which is the senior members - and they made some arrangementsand 
then they (senior members on both sides) made some kinda of accomodations 
as to the witnesses we would call. But apparently when we got to the 
committee they had classified them into two groups. One group of witnesses 
they would agree to call - the other group of witnesses they would first 
examine them and then if they had anything new to add, and Rodino ------
thought that they had anything new to add, then we would examine them as 
witnesses. Wiggins and the other senior people who participated felt like 
this was a change in pattern and they weren't bound by it. And so during 
the course of the morning, it became apparent that this whing wasn't going 
to sail through and the first time I 1 ve seen Rodino - and all day long he 
was pretty testy about things like that - but eventually it passed. 
Now what happened was - Sandman offered a resolution, a substitute resolution 
which in effect, after it had been dealt with - would mean that all the 
witnesses, including Erlichman, Hamdeman and Colson, would be called - Erlichman 
is not in there - including Colson and so forth would be called, and to 
testify and not go through this class II proceeding first, which suited me 
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B fine and I was supporting Sandman in what he was trying to do. And it began 
to shafe up in a vote - a kinda test vote with two people - orBrien, who was 
a lawyer for the committee and another man named Bitman, who was a lawyer 
who picked up the money on the bribe - $75,000 which is so critical. 
So that amendment was amended to provide - that was the Sandman amendment 
or substitute for the principal amendment by Thornton. 
✓ 
About the time Hoganrs amendment passed which added these two people to Class I 
witnesses, Don Edwards walked over to Peter Rodino and whispered something 
to him and then we went into recess. He said for half an hour - that was a 
5 orclock, then during - about 10 minutes later we had a vote and we all went 
to the floor and we came back at 5:25 or 5:30 and the Democrats were caucusing 
in the Democrat office there and evidently they whipped then in line cause 





it failed by a vote of 19-19 with two Democrats defecting - now this is 
sdgnificant because two people switched their votes in the meanwhile from 
the Hogan amendment before we went to lunch which was 21 - 17 to the 19-19 split 
(not before we went to lunch but before we went to recess) and the 19-19 
split afterwards which being less than a ma~ority did not pass and we went 
back to the main motion. The two people - on Edwards had switched his vote, 
and Jim Mann had switched his vote - from S.C. So this meant that the 
democrats had a solid front. But Wayne Owens and Wlater Flowers remained 
with us but k there is no possibility that Owens would vote against impeach-
ment but it does indicate that Walter Flowers is pretty much committed to 
follow the Republican line and thatrs - I would say that hers pretty much 
an indication at this point that hers not going to vote for an impeachment. 
And every comment he makes is pointed in that direction. 
Jim Mann - I would think - judge - from the indications - is going the other 
way. Now thatrs my guess at this moment. 
So anyway there were several votes thereafter who tried to add Colson, 
Mitchell, Haldeman to the Class I witnesses - those on a motion by Hamilton 
Fish - David Dennis tried to add a lot more witnesses, that wasn 1 t quite the 
same vote; a motion to include Erlichman as a witness that we would call was 
eated 19-19 and that for the first time, I think the partisan - it 1 s really 
shaping up into a partisan thing. I think the Republicans are right. Any 
witnesses that anybody thinks can shed any light on it ought to be called 
but Rodino is obviously is getting a lot of pressure to finish by the 12th 
of July and that 1 s - I 1 m sure the committee will and it 1 s a shame to see 
them panic after having such orderly procedures to this point and rrm disappoint-
ed in that. I think it 1 s a real mistake. 
Is it getting close tom panic - do you think? 
Well, yeah, I think it 1 s every bit of that. I mean, Rodino, first time I 
felt like he was losing control of ±Mimi himself - I mean not a raving manic 
- but I mean he 1 s been very calm up to now and laughed off a lot of things, 
this is the first time I felt like he was - the pressure was beginning to 
get to him cause I think he 1 s compromising what he set out to do under 
pressure and Del Latta is the one that 1 s needling him about that several 
times yesterday and obviously it got under his skin. 
---During our early examination I asked counsel about why we couldn 1 t call John 
Erlichman as a witness and have him come in and tell us he 1 s unavailable. 
Same way about John Mitchell - both of them are under trial and we were 
advised that we not call them as witnesses and their lawyers stated that 
they won 1 t testify - won 1 t authorize them to testify but of course they 1ll 
' Page 4- 6/ 27/74-
J 
answer a subpena. The point I make is - the pmint I want to emphasize is - this 
is pretty unique that our committee can subpena the President, talk about 
subpening a Federal Judge and yet weTre not going after a defendent in court. 
John Doar dropped the ball. ThereTs such a thing that you call use~£ immunity 
which means that anything that we the course of our proceeding 
if - canTt be used against him in pPejudice the trial 
I wouldnTt think - cause know 
aEou ut it is a time r ocedure and 
e ind. Should have started on things like this long ago and 
"1:--:c---=~.,-~=--=--~s~i~g~n~i~f~icant point is now that counsel is covering up his own 
failure to move early on Erlichman and Mitchell by recommendations trat we 
not call them at this point and ixxnNk ITm disappointed in that - I think 
Erlichman ought to be called as a witnessR but heTs not going to be and so 
weTre stuck with it. We had very little problem getting through the Hungate 
amendment to XNR in effect ask the House to authorize us to curtail the right 
of Committee members to examine witnesses and we are NEB - and our intention 
of course is to adopt a rule that we submit our questions in writing to counsel 
and there wasnTt much opposistion to that. ThatTs the note on which we 
closed. Closed the day. 
twas interesting - as we were closing - Kastenmier wanted to bring up a bill 
that wasnTt on the agenda which authorized the DAR patent - extended again for 
another 14- years - and - but our friend John Conyers objected. He asked 
estion of Kastenmier about who ha recently. 
Or words o that effect - obviously the DAR is not one of the favorites of the 
black members of the committee and so rather than move - for which we could 
have done on two-thirds vote to suspend the rules and go ahead and take it 
p, Kastenmier chose not to do it that way. 
One other thing of interest - during the course of our deliberations it became 
tu 
apparent to me that the witness list did not include DeMarco or anybody 
related to the tax question. Now John Doar had made a ~peech earlier in the 
~ week - I mean at the end of our deliberations on taxes in which he felt like 
~ 
we ought to go after it - now the joint committee on taxation submitted a series 
of questions to the President which the President never answered. I felt like 
these questions should be answered simply because they go to basically to the 
\~-" question of whether the PresidentTs intention - he never ~Rail~ has really 
~ f~ been examined closely on what he had in mind and what he knew about k;µ.s this 
f-~
eMarco and there isnTt any question in my mind, DeMarco is a first class either 
~LI, stoop or croo½. That was my conclusion. And ought to be disbarred. I not1ce ' 
Y- l 'lh"e" nasnTt lost his rights - his notary license - which must hand him much. 
~,r~l'ThatTs a wonderful way to start the day. In anyrexR event I wrote out a 
~ resolution which would say that the President shall~ tbat the committee 
shall impopound - I wrote it out in longhand - resolved that the comm1tt~e 
'"""'x,mA ... +~ :i=he President those interrogatories heretofore propounded by 
ttee on Internal Revenue Taxation and then I sent it down 
onn Doar for his c her it was in appropriate form. He 
p ram is desk and came back to talk wo me and exp aine o me that 
Congressman Mezvinsky, that Polac dropout down at the other end there, was 
going to offer the same xiN thing or substantially the same thing, so I 
didnTt draft it or submit it because I dirlnTt relish the idea of being identified 
with that from the Republican point of view, but I felt like it ought to be done. 
Earlier in the day I had asked Mr. Thornton if he had any other plans to 
(
pursue this question in his motion to call witnesses and he said no - the 
question might come up later. So I let it go at that. Toward the end of 
the day I went over to Mazinsky and asked him if he was prepared to offer his 
question on interrogatories and he said no - well, he said what he had 
was a letter - directed that we send a leteer to the President. Well, that 
was a pretty watered down version of what I wanted to do but - not as str 
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B as interrogatory but we haven't gone the interrogatory route as yet. 
nd Doar incidentally, mentioned to me that he thought the questions 
were not very well written and they wanted to phrase them themselves 
and all that sort of stuff. For some reason they are shying away 
from interrogatories because you give the respondent a chance to evade 
- in the course of the President's interview, conversation with - on 
March 21st - you remember where he said, nLet's get 'em to submit 
interrogatories. We can deal with that. TT So the whole committee is 
shying away from interrogatories for that reason. So I didn't argue 
~
.fl'"th Mezvinsky. 
~ / But then he came alonf and a~ offered at the end of the day - he offered 
that and the chairman ruled him out of order. First he asked for unanimous 
consent to bring up the question of directing the counsel - that the 
counsel write a letter to the President and then the objection was made 
by some Republican on the grounds that it wasn't noted and so then he 
made a motion and the chairman ruled him out of order because it wasn't 
,J. on the agenda. I then signaled him from my corner that go on and make 
(f~ a motion and it would take a 2/3rds vote - to put it on the agenda. I 
~
hought he had the votes but then the Republicans started talking about 





amendment for general interrogatories but he had been told b~h~ chairman 
th.at be wonJ d be out of order so it won] d he a great vehicle for _him. 
Apd so he was gojng to support jt- ~11, of course that killed it with 
kindness because no bod~, wa □ted to sta,y around that time to argue tha't 
issue so Mezvh;u;;ky withdrew it and we bave oo assura.Q£e that we are 
going to follow that route and I think its an ex~le of - I don't 
.think its an example of a cover up but I think its a~ example of _Eoor 
pl.anning and I'ro increasing aware af the fact that John Doar is a good 
·etective but damned poor procedurist - and - weak procedurally and it 
seems to me - and also the democratic-aaucus hasn't got a strong man 
in there putting things together - cause somebody should have put 
this thing together and gotten something on the agenda to take •are 
of that problem. Now I'm not - I guess I should have carried it but 
I was faked out by John Doar. 
Is it foreclosed now. 
No. We'll have to have a business meeting now to bring it up but I don't 
know when it will be because we are now going to go into 10 days of hearings -
I mean 7 days of hearings - St. Clair is going to put on his show today. 
And we don't know what's going to take up next after that - but that is 
where we are. I'm afriad that that's about as good a place as we got to 
break - do you want to ask me some questions - about yesterday. 
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B We are dictating on the first of July but we are talking about Thursday 
the 27th of June. 
Now St. Clair opened his presentation - this is the first time he had 
really been permitted to speak to the committee and he had sat there 
{
pretty docile but he began by saying that regardless of what you hear 
elsehwere, in his judgement, the President's counsel had been treated 
with the utmost courtesy by the committee. There was some jockeying 
around but basically he sort of led us to believe that he perceived 
his role much as the same as Doar and Jenner. 
W As a fact finder or did he spell it ... 
B At this pointm it's just simply a statement of facts that he thought ought 
to be called to our attention that haven't been called by Doar. And so then 
he went into it and started reading his tabs and St. Clair gives the 
inflection - he reads differently from Doar - for example , I was - his 
emphasis on one particular thing was interesting - he was reading from 
the testimony of John Dean and he said the first time I ever talked to the Pres. 
:t~zkioozwas on Sept. 15th. He emphasized the 11 evern and so he was persuasive 
as compared with - and an advocate in a subtle way as compared with the 
monotone that John Doar developed. 
We had some exchanges with him about SEl!JlR the transcripts - course the 
substance of what he contributed wasn't substantial in my judgement. But 
he emphasized some things that probably ought to be emphasized. He's tearing 
down Dean but he's not - I think the significant thing was that he was - he's 
pretty much singled out an area to concentrate on and that's it. And I 
guess it's fair to state that what he was concentrating on with reference 
l
to the early - the Watergate testimony - was tearing down John Dean and ) 
emphasizing the President's limited knowledge or lack of knowledge prior 
to March 21st and then he galvanized into action on that time - after that 
point. -
We had a gnurum call early in the game and we started to leave. We suggested 
we stay but the democrats got up and walked out so we went on and walkd out 
ourselves but I would say overall the aemocrat attendance during St. Clair's 
presentation was less than - as great as it had been in Doar 1 s presentation. 
I don 1 t think we can attach too much significance to that. 
W Three or four absent ... 
B On, no - eight or ziex0~zxh nine of them were. (W Just never showed up or ... ) 
No, they came and left - they just weren 1 t entertained. Had a long chat with 
Waldie riding back on the train and comparing St. Clair presentation vs. Doar's 
and we agreed it was different but Walter felt that St. Clair had more 
latitude in his presentation cause he was an advocate and indeed - at one 
time, St. Clair pointed out that he was employed by the President and he 
wasn 1 t going to misstate any facts but he was going to certainly going 
to present the ones that he thought were favorable to his client. Nobody 
could fault him for that. 
good 
I felt like Doar - that St. Clair just had a g~eax deal more personality 
than Doar and he was demonstrating it. Well, W~was defensive ~bout that. 
He said that Doar had a great deal of personality, he just M~MMX~/ a~~eloped 
this. This monotone• We 1 re reading more in the pressx that this has killed 
- not killed the impeachment - but killed the enthusiamm for it. 
W What - the monotone. 
"-
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w 
3/ ~~~7 
I think there was ~pres~ ~ that Mann fell asleep during one ... 
B Well, yeah, thatrs right. Well, he drones anyway - he puts anybody to sleep. 
W You donrt think itrs true - you donrt think that monotone has had ... 
~ I think thats his natural charm.- (last word not claar) but I could be wrong. 
W Do you think that style has had minimal effectxxRNRXX ... 
B I think thatrs lock and key - I donrt think that - I thmnk thatrs the appropriate 
way to present ti~ it but I donrt think it has any effedt on it - I just think 
droning out facts, you just canrt make - he wasnrt hired to present it in any 
other ga fashion. 
Interesting the way St. Clair handled his antagonists. Ms. Holtzman undertook 
to corner him on the transcripts really - and then criticised him for the 
differences but he was pretty - between the presidential transcript and our 
staff transcripts of the same tape - and he wasnrt really defensive about it. 
He did admit that - he emphasized that they were put together under his super-
vision and he was responsible for them butn he didnrt think there were any 
substantive aifferences and I made a notethe first time that he got into this 
exchange that he does handle these sort of questions beautifully and with a 
smile. She never cornered him - she tried several times. 
There is one - his emphasisis is on the state of knowledge of the president 
from time to time and I think thatrs probably really what werre looking for. 
For the first time I found out - maybe I hadnrt been that alert - that in 
political matters memorandum which Strong would give to Haldeman if the 
Presidentrs attention was indicated - Haldeman would put a big npn by it 
and then after he had discussed it with the President, herd draw a line 
through it. Which indicates once more how well organized Mr. Haldeman 
was. 
At one time we did get into the question of the best evidence - that is 
the tapes ... 
W Excuse me one minute - was St. Clair drawing the inference that if the line 
wasnrt drawn - that would indicate that the President wouldnrt know - was 
there some -
B No, this was just a - there wasnrt any particular instance in which - if that 
had any significance - but it was information that I hadnrt previous noted.~ 
It may have been one of those monotones I slept through, I donrt know. 
Waldie objected one time on the grounds that he ought not to be allowed to 
refer to transcripts that we didnrt have the tapes on. Irve forgotten which 
particular conversation it was - April 14th I think. And that - for a mommnt 
I thought we were gmld: going to bog down on that point and he was going to 
have to back and clean up his transcript and so forth - transcript of April 4th, 
1972, we donrt have the - 4/13 - now we donrt have the tape on that. werve 
got a transcript submitted later but not the tape. fix Transcript was submitted 
but not the tape and WaMdie says he ought not be citing t~r· t wen we 
didnrt have the tape cause it violates the so-called best e and so 
we couldN have bogged down. Fact we have several times - we d an opportunity 
tog bogf down and Rodino finally rulea that these points of order for 
questions would be d.tflered until later - which meant that we would never get 
around to it. .__.-
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B So, we skipped it. 
W Well, what happened - aid St. Clair just continue along the same line ... 
B Every now and then they would raise a question about it and the chair 
would rule that we would take that up later. So St. Clair was entitled - did 
XE present his thing without interruption really. 
W And Rodino was really saving the day for him on that? 
B I don 1 t think he was saving the day - I think it was the proper ruling but 
it could have ... 






Yeah. He was saving the day for progress. St. Clair had observed that - he 
prepared the tapes = that he thought there were transcripts - they were 
reasonably accurate. Now the manner and procedure I have approved, he 
emphasized. He spot checked them from time to time, that they were prepared 
by lawyers and then he said, of course, lawyers have secretaries because 
law~ers are very poor typists and so that was the main m~sage we got out 
of that. But he insisted every time that the substantive=iYiessage was much 
the same. (?) 
Rodino got after him once because he concluded but I don 1 t think that was 
too substantive. 
I can 1 t help noticing that the presentation of the White House - presentation 
was less professional than ours in that the paper was cheaper and the typing 
was not so accurate and these things. But I think the White House staff must 
be working awfully hard - awfully hard and under a lot of pressure and itrs 
apparent every now and then. I read the brief that he filed in the Jaworski 
case and then I read Jaworskirs brief and certainly Jaworski 1 s was on a little 
bit higher level mechanically. I think he 1 s got a better point too. 
This is the brief to the Supreme Court? 
Yes, and the Supreme Court case involving the subpena of the tapes and the 
Watergate N case or whatever you 1 re calling that case - itrs the conspiracy 
case - the obstruction of justice case - the one in which the President 
maintains their support of the Supreme Court to get it together - the Supreme 
Court case to get the subpenas and that 1 s the one the President 1 s invfillved in 
and everything. I read the briefs over the weekend and I think Jaworski 1 s 
is a much better brief - one reason is he 1 s got a much better point- points. 
I predict at the moment that the Supreme Court will come out pretty promptly 
with an opinion on that and it wax will say that the President has to surrender 
these tapes. It concerns me that we might have a vote in committee - and 
then have these tapes come back and take another look at them before we go 
to the £loor. So that would be interesting. 
What points - basic points do you see in the Jaworski brief 
point is - he makes two or three points - but I think the one 
significant as far as werre concerned is th.at the President 
information affecting 
executive privilege and fbat WOuld 
l1~..1.ul1 u.1. Lllt:: uuc LJ."..Lllt:: u.1. executive rivilege very far when it 
affects litigation~ Wli.en t e court is making a request for information 











a vital interest because he 1 s under scrutiny for impeachment as well as a 
unnamed co-conspirator - those circumstances he clearly has a duty - it seems 
to me to surrender them. And then of course there 1 s the further question 
of - as he we ighs his constitutional rights - to executive privilege and his 
right to maintain an executive privilege when he has published some 1200 
pages of transcripts already so you can 1 t really have a partial waiver, that 1 s 
the argument and I believe he 1 s got the better of that argument. 
I read in Newsweek today that Charles Allen Wright has left the country - on 
a cruise at the moment which can only indicate a lack of interest or sympathy 
for the White House position. Before the Supreme Court, he 1 s leaving St. 
Clair to hold the bag as it were. 
Okay, well there were four volumes - as opposed to some 35-4-0 volumes on 
- more than that - I don 1 t know - four volumes with St. Clair contrasting 
with the 35 that John Doar presented us. We covered ITT on the first day, 
Thursday, Watergate and ITT. I was impressed with his presentation of the 
ITT information and ~R the real sound basis for concluding that there was 
genuine agreement almost in the llepartment of Justice that they ought not 
to appeal except for ±RekmiealxEeas0ns tactical reasons and not - so the 
Presidentts decision was a sound one not to appeal it based on the law and 
so I think pretty well he exhonorates the President as far as ITT is 
concerned. Now thatxs doesn 1 t have to do with the Kleindist. 
It was significant that he was silent on Kleindist (W- St. Clair was) St. Clair 
didntt give us anything about Kleindist. I was a little shocked really. I 
asked him if that was all of his evidence when he got through cause I thought 
he would have to tell us something to defend the president on this point 
but I think he relying on the theory that the President 1 s misrepresentation 
bylKleindist prevarications were not - were daminimus or fair game or something 
like that. Anyway we will probably hear that in argument. He didntt make 
any factual determinations or presentation with reference to that. 
Nothing at all - he tried to hit that - Did anyone else try to bring that out 
Well, it wasn 1 t the time to ±N bring it out - I mean it was (W-To bring 
in the facts on it) thatts right, he didntt present the facts so we passed 
on. But I felt like it was sort of an omission because that troubled me 
not as much apparently - troubled me apparently more than anybody else. 
On Friday - now Jenner wasntt with us on Thursday - but we toughed it out 
anyway - ka he was back on Friday morning. 
Why does that trouble you? 
Well, it still bothers me that the President of the United States was 
misrepresenting Kleindist 1 s status when he was nominated. He just plain 
misrepresented it now I think we 1 ve discussed that before - evidently 
somewhere I got off the line because Judge Hart didntt even send Kleindist 
to jail so maybe I consider that a larger offense than others. As a matter 
of fact I don 1 t find people upset about that that Itve chatted with so I 1 m 
may be a little bit off on that - chock me - but it may be what we call a 
puffing and merchandising operation - but it 1 s disturbing me. 
It shocked you that Kleindist would do it - would lie ... 
It shocked me more that the President of the United States would tell 
the people of the United States that I have great confidence in this 
~ man who just lied to you. 
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W Why don 1 t we just go u:m<z down and do it in front of the U.S. Senate ... 
B Well, that 1 s wrong. And of course now on Friday, June 28th, that was the 
morning I had the nice article by Helen Dewar in the Washington Post which 
gave me a little celebrity status as I walked in there but it didn 1 t last 
long. Nothing like Mezvinsky and the Time Magazine. 
W What did they say to you? 
B Oh, just - well, Wiggins thought it was funny that I referred to myself 
as an abororiginie - he thought that implied a cave man. Several of them 
- several people wanted my autograph but I wouldn 1 t mess with that. That 1 s 
the way we killed it in committee and so then I went back to work. 
Again I was impressed with the way St. Clair handled himself when he 1 s 
/ challenged on an accuracy or a conclusion or something in his summary, 
//
he simply points out that the committeeman is probably right and he 
should just go ahead and just ignore that statement . And the jury will , 
not be persuaded he says, you 1 re the ultimate determiners of fact and if / 
you don 1 t believe what I say then you 1 re not persuaded and igz~ERzxz just 
ignore it. And it 1 s kinda of a disarming approach. 





Now I had to take ruff for the House Administration Committee mRe±iNgxaNa 
in the middle of that cause we were winding up the deal on campaign disclosure 
and I wanted a couple of amendments which incidentally I finally got ruled 
on and knocked out. It was a wasted-~ffort but I was following that 
legislation. So I got out of ±um~/i£ut when I came back I didn 1 t get -
didn 1 t £eel like I was missing much. We did discover during our lunch - I 
left shortly before lunch - and came back after lunch. We discovered during 
this lunch break that t4j ~tar-News had all of the information that he 1 d 
given us and Josh Wilke!•fook a great deal of pleaxure in pointing out that 
it was a Republican source that did it. And I was emparrassed and I think 
we should be but maybe that 1 s the way we play the game. 
I did notice that St. Clair tired at the end of the day. I never had the 
feeling that John Doar or Albert Jenner were quite as tired as he was at 
the end of two days. It wasn 1 t apparent in his reading or anything, he 
just - he was tired and you could see it from his reaction. This is the 
same day in which Rodino - the news release came out - that Rodino was 
saying that 21 democrats would vote for impeachment. I talked with Walter 
Flowers - walked back with him - and it was clear to me that he wasn 1 t - he 
hadn 1 t committed himself at this point. Seiberling was indignant at the 
:JacR republicans - I heard him talking to Rodino - he was indignant that the 
republicans had leaked - they were jump±ing on the thing ±k when he thought 
it was an inadvertan~e. Bill Young - and all the republicans on the floor 
were all stirred up about this thing - they had a quick conference in Joe 
Bartlett 1 s office, the minority clerk, and had Hutchinson and Rose (or Rhodes) 
John Anderson and - lot of people in there - and I think they jumped on 
Rodino a little bit and I think probably prematurly. At the insistance 
of the speaker, Rodino took the floor and had about an eight minute speech. 
I didn 1 t hear it. I was back in the committee 
But I don 1 t think it was particularly 
denial of the statem 
them to come back. 
a categorical 
ickly by a statement 
-:-1- It didn 1 t 
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W Sam Donnelson make it? 
B Yeah, Sam Donnelson. But itrs interesting that he wasnrt unnerved by it. 
He said that he was misquoted and that was that. I believed him. I chatted 
with liim a little bit about that. I just was surprised that he wasnrt more upset 
about it. But he said, well, he wasnrt and that was that. 
W You felt he should have been more ... 
B Yeah, I think he sbOL1Jd have been pretty indignant if somebody violated 
his confidence which I thJ..rik they had. A vigorous denial - I mean- after 
al.F--that 1 s pretty much what they are tryi~ to impeach the president for. 
And it ought to give you a little humility when you think you can be 
misquoted - misrepresented by the press but it didnrt do anything of that 
to him. 
W He seemed right hot on the floor - sEz±zatxmigN.txzazRzEeRn some of that 








Yeah, well, hers very emotional in situations. I could see why he would get 
upset but by the time I saw him he had pretty much unwound. 
He'd calmed down. 
Didnrt bother him a bit - went on through the rest of the afternoon. 
You know you were mentioned in that article ... 
Los Angeles Times - where was I mentioned? 
He was quoted as having said that he assessed that the 21 democrats were going 
to vote for impeachment and then there were - they would need - he thought 
they would need 5 republican votes from the committee in order for it to go 
to the House with some impact and then he listed about 6 or 7 republicans 
as he considered possible impeachment voters - and you were one of them. It 
was pretty much the same ... 
Yeah, well, thatrs interesting to know. I do feel that the democrats look 
upon me as a hope - why even ~ was nice to me as he clipped an 
article out of the Washington Post and presented it to me. I told him that 
I felt like ±rut when he picked up the gavel it was just like giving Jack 
the Ripp¥' a new knife and he was not insulted. But he -~ insisted that 
he trea~ me fairly which he had. 
St. Clair closed his presentation by going over the tax qeustion. I didnrt 
take many notes because I didnrt think he added much to the sum total of 
knowledge. He did have an affadavit - well, one thing we got into quite 
an exchange over - was whether he represented the President or the Presidency 
and I donrt know why we got into that - but we did. And he was emphasizing 
that he wasnrt the tax lawyer for the President and he didnrt have any relation-
ship to that problem so he had turned that over to - ,he h.d a~davits from 
J 
his tax x counsel which he filed with us and pretty filled it out. It look 
~to me like that the Joint Committee on Taxation had moved pretty fast on the 
~
esident and that he wasnrt - counsel really wasnrt given an opportunity to 
ilea briefs or anything of that nature. rrm a little bit - itrs easy to 
nderstand why the President didnrt answer those questions that were sent 
1 o him by the Joint Committee that had been worrying me - I just think 
they made their decision before he got around to him - although therers 
no assurance ... 
• 
Page 7 xi.xx 7/ 1/ 74-
W You think he might have answered it if herd had a chance ... 
B I think the Joint Committee could have blackmailed them out of him - could j 
have forced them out of him by declining to rule and focusing on the points. 
W Where are the - whatrs the thrust of those questions? 














reference to various transactions. -
They are listed in the Joint report -
They are listed in the Joint report and they are given to us ang_ Jim 
Johnson from Colorado was very much - feels very much at this time that 
the"President"'s tax situation was 2Learly fraudulent and that, as a lawyer, 
he knew better and that has a lot of merit but at the moment therers not 
a lot of thrust being given to that but this goes back to what 1rve been 
saying all along - nobody knows whatrs significant and what is not significant 
until we get some kinda view from counsel as to how we would proceed if 
we choose to impeach. 
Thatrs been prmmised to us and promised to us and promised to us but as mf 
the present moment, the promises are getting closer together and I think 
we should get it tomorrow - July 2nd. But that was the ene of our business 
on Friday. As a matter of fact I left about 10 minutes before they concluded 
because my wife was here and I was hungry and wanted to head for Roanoke - all 
of which made me leave 10 minutes early and I donrt think I mR missed a thing. 
Now that takes care of the 27th and the 28th - now on the weekend, we stayed 
in Washington ... 
Before you leave St. Clair, I get the impression that it was just not that 
effective a performance or it wasnrt that effective a case - that he had to 
work with. 
Well I think basically itrs this - John Doar has put together all the fac 
completely and there are not really many facts that he can add and that was 
what his job was. Now hers going to get a day in court to advocate - to as 
he says to present a brief and that will come after the 12th of July and 
thatrs right around the conner. 
So you really - in this presentation - the committee didnrt really get too much 
of a sense of St. Clair as defender -
No, it was a subtle defense - because it certainly was defensive and certainly 
wasnrt aggressive and I think overall very effective in the sense that he 
didnrt overpush - didnrt over do it. Now I think given this situation I 
pretty much would have handled it pretty much the same way. So I think 
he left us pretty well feeling that ITT was a policy decision that the 
President interferred in but not - interferred in perhaps but pushed them 
in the direction that they should have gone in anyway - that the presidentrs 
tax situation is that he was relying on counsel - now that I have trouble 
buying but thatrs basically that view of it and as far as Watergate is 
concerned, the President had no knowledge after March - before March 21st 
and he bore down after that. Did everything consistent with his - and thatrs 
- thatrs - I mean he wasnrt as convincing on all scores but thatrs about what 
he left us with and thatrs a pretty good presentation. 
Did this ~ing with kindness approach - did this seem to frustrate any of 
the, what you might call, impeachment red-hots among the democrats, you know 
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W those who really want ... 
B I think those that were there were very attentive to him and he does have a 
certain amount of charm and he didn 1 t burden us with enough to put us all 
to sleep. It was a busy day on the floor so we had more interruptions -
W You were in and out ... 
B right - but he was a good sport about that. Now that takes us through the 
28th - Friday 
W To the weekend - okay. 
On the weekend, Junie was here so we stayed in that night - we even had a 
:Q.Ee in t ~e fireQliice- - it was such a cool night up here -and -we got up reasonably 
ear°Iy the next morning and drove back to Roanoke and today we were ~Ra pretty 
tired. I don 1 t think we really had much contact - I was supposed to dedicate 
a Post Office - open a Post Office but I never made that but they went off -
the mail must go through. 
There wasn 1 t anything really eventful over the weekend. I went to church 
Sunday morning and we 1 re lookin for a new preacher and so I didn 1 t stay 
around to comment on that. I figured that 1 s one problem I 1 d let the folks 
handle for themselves and so I went on home after church and hung around 
t be house and just plain took life easy because ... and I don 1 t know, my 
children now are beginning to suggest - Jimmy was the only one home at the 
time - but maybe I 1 m not listening because he keeps coming up with things 
,,in~ and asking me about them. l 7m not responding to them very clearly 
so I spent the weekend readin o ek rragazines and things like that 
an~ s i ave t e transcripts there - the Presi ent s submissions I went 
, through that again and I read Jaworski's brief which was very convincing 
1 to the point that the President has got no business fighting this thing 
and it mk makes me believe and I 1 ve thought all along that it 1 s a delitory 
tactic, why, I 1 m not sure but it 1 s sure that. Maybe it is apparent why 
it 1 s a delitory tactic in that the President is now going to - may very 
well - it may come to a vote - we may come to a vote before he 1 s ready to 
turn loose of those tapes. Now, let 1 s stop the tape cause tMexzx~Rz~aMsR 
I don 1 t see what I can .•. 
V Today - July 1, we only had a meeting at 3 p.m. called for the purpose 
if1':' of determining whether we are going to close these meetings or not and 
~
after a lot of wrangling, we voted to do it. The democrat.s want to close 
it - republicans basically WJ.l]!t want to - I wa.s strickly on the fence. 
I wa.s_rec!_dy to go with the democrats - nut:hfuJ..1.-y : - uii fil r - ~ ided 
1/'V' ~ I was tired of being the only · re"jmblican out there and this wasnt t hat 
~ l s igi'r15"canr a vote .. Thi s was to close· it - I voted to then to open and 
.;r
1
_;.I j-"( they l:loted to close. You see the rules provide that they are open unless 
{ r ~ we vote to close them so we huve to vote to close them and that was the 
,'0;»-: purpose of it. It 1 s funny that Waldie who many suspect as being the big 
'11.~~ leader was the one who made the motion - can 1 t help thinking that if we 
 were in public why they 1 d put him out of business. Not in an economic 
sense but in an entertainment sense. But the democrats voted solidly to 
close the meeting and then there were too good a republican position 
to be in so I went along with the republicans and all but two of them 
to voted to open - I voted not to close - and I don 1 t have any trouble 
defending that, we 1 ve gone too far - we voted to open early in the week 
±M l~st week - turned loose of all the stuff we have so it 1 s just a question 
of time so I thought maybe we 1 d just let the press come in and listen to 
this stuff. But, but they didn 1 t show. It was voted on party lines to 
do it. So that 1 s about all that took place in the committee. That was in 
~ 
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B itself a public session - business session and so forth. Early in the day, 
well, let's see, I did neglect to mention that on Friday, the 28th, as we 
were leaving we brought up this resolution to - when did we bring that thing 
up, I 1 ve forgotten, a resolution to suspend the rules and rei:ruest that the 
rules be suspended after the 5 minute rule. The 5 minute rule is the rule 
which provides that every committee must give every member of the committee 
5 minutes to examine every witness and you've got 38 Clarence Darrows like 
ours and it didn't make a lot of sense to have that rule when we were gomng 
to have a limited number of witnesses and we were in a hurry to get away. 
o, we had a resoiliution from the committee - passed by a pretty substantial 
margin of the committee to - and I believe I discussed that with you 
earlier (W - I don't think we did.) It oook place one day last week and 
I didn't think it was Friday, I thought it wax took place on Wednesday 
afternoon - the 26th of June - and I don't believe we talked about that 
before - yep - we have, that's the last thing that took place on the 26th 
of June. By a vote of 31 - 6 we voted to do it this way to get rid of the 
- of this 5 minute rule for the particular hearing, let the committee suspend 
is what it amounts to. Well when it got to the floor, several of the 6 indignant 
republicans made a big thing out of ft and there was under suspension which 
meant it would take a 2/3rd vote so it was defeated. 
I mentioned that to Rodino that I thought maybe the next thing to do was 
to go back and try to get a rule which meant it would only have to come 
up on a majority vote. So he'd had a belly full of it so that's the way 
we're going to go from now on. I also suggested to him that there's a middle 
ground they should explored and that's assigning so much time to each side 
in the commitee and let them, rather than try to have this rule on questions, 
he didn't - he thought it was too late. But I feel like this advisory 
committee that he's got is not measuring up to their responsibility so they 
surely should have x~em ironed this thing out before we had a big fiasco on 
the floor. It indicates a lack of confidence in the committee and I feel 
like maybe they've got no more confidence than that in the mmmittee, we might 
as well throw this thing out on the floor and let them vote on it - get 
it over with and that 1 s where we are. 
Early in the day when we first got there and this is Monday morning, July 1st, 
we had a republican caucus but we didn't get too much accomplished there. 
Jenner was present and Jenner was really logging kinda - I mean he answered 
our questions and we discussed things but it was an inconclusive discussion 
and so far as I could tell we had gone one way with very little accomplished. 
:H:::was incidentally mn Bob McClory's office and not in Ed Hutchinson's office 
SQ McClory I think is trying iv us some direction in an area which 
Ed didn't seem willing to do and so I think we survived that. we 
had a caucus this morning which for- all practical purposes didn't accomplish 
anything. But we had a general exchange of views and but nothing substantial 
really occurred. l think we might inquire - was this trip really necessary? 
We had planned a meeting with the House leadership later on in the day ~ 
after the Judiciary Committee meeting but that dragged on so long that it 
was called off. So we begin hearing our first witness on tomorrow, July 2nd, 
without the benefit of any definitive party lines on how we are going to 
proceed which I think is alright. We only know we are going to proceed with 
the 5 minute rule and if we finish the first witness, Mr. Butterfield, in my 
lifetime, it will surpiise me. 
Now that takes us down to the present. Now where do you want to go back 
and try to pick up or if anything. 
W Probably ought to break - it's getting a little late. 
Meeting of June 25th 
(Tape of July 3rd) 
Recalling meeting of June 25th lasttTuesday. 
,t, ...,_w-JJ_,.,, fl/,,,_ e:~ 
~~ We opened up the ~----of Siley Maine who wanted disclosure of all the /U.,(_,,{__j;~ 
J\::--contri buthow prio~e .legislation which was in question or with referencetothe 
Presiden~ involve~ ....-·~ Le..., offered a point of ,.;l~der and he was getting ready to 
argue when Jack lt.,,&~ suggested that he motionfitr the table so we could go on and 
get disposed of it and voted down that would be the end of it. The motion at th~ -/4 
table was defeated by a motion of 15-21 which meant that Jack Brook's strategy had 
backfir~~~i nd W:e had to talk about it a little. The significaRce of this was that 
there W:~ ack of o~ganization on the Democratic majority side .and Jack Brooks's 
isin't as popular ~ 'big- mouth would i ndrrcate. This is the second day in the ro±c ,~ ~ • 
where as Bill Wecga,H votedJ(eRublican..,, · · 
/~~ .. ~\~ 
There was some erosion in the Democratic Party. Jack ~-.--will not be able to vote 
over on that trial by just being rude. Ed Hutson suprised me on the point of order 
by saying that it came to l a te. The thing that struck me was the lack of organization 
on the Democratic Party side. Rodino had the expression that the motion that was to 
disclose the ~-~-----Contributions was not germain to our resolutions. He had 
that opinion but did not rule it out of order. Ray Thronton probably made the best 
argument with the Democrat s that it was a question of whether the promise of 
money was a factor on the President ' s decismon or not. I think this was an over-
simplification--the plain factor is that the president was being subjected to a lot 
of pressure from Congress for the same reason that they are not saying that the 
President made his decision on the same basis that Congress had placed his pressure. 
So I thought this was relevant but this was a straight party-line vote on this motion 
and I thought that it was relevant for the Committee to know that the president was 
being subjected to pressure from the Congress. The pressure from the Congess came 
from the same source that they claim the pressure from the President came from nnly 
the accumulated effect of it makes it ____ that it was a political decision and bribe. 
Executive Session We had to go into the Executive Session because the rules 
provide that we cannot release the information without going into the Executive Session. 
My view of it is that it wastes an awful lot n of time. The point is that when we got 
in t here I don ' t believe that we discussed anything that could not be revealed in public. 
Session of July 2nd The aryuments that took place and the votes were pretty clear along 
the party line vote that the President was entitled to have every witness that he 
wanted. (I voted with this wing every time). 
This is the day that Wiggins suggested that we discuss sensitive matters. The things 
that he was concerned with that the President speculated on guilt of John Mitchell 
several times at the close of his conversation. They speculated on the theory of 
which obstruction of justice would be _ involved and a few things of that nature 
and he did not want this to get out because the trial is set for September 7th. 
We eventually voted to release the information in support of the motion that was made 
by Casteride . (not sure) The idea is that there will be no release of a volume at 
a tlffie as 1ti is printed. 
June 25th -- Presentation of evidence 
June 26th -- The day that we discussed the witnesses. Thronton made the motion to 
call the lighter witnesses. They were passing the motions down the line and this 
happened to be his term. I couldn't help from observing that it was prepared for 
him, but he made a good presentation. However, it did limit a number of 
witnesses (4 or 5) pretty severly and we had to class two witnesses to be 
reinterviewed and then called ief -tJ'le majority of the member thought it was neccessary 
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after consultation of the staff. It was probably necessary to limit the number of 
witnesses but I thought it was pretty severe. Then there was an Executive Session 
and the argument was whether to discuss these witnesses 1n public or private sessions. 
Y Thronton moved that we i go into an Executive Session afld the vote was 25-13 to lh2 
m do this. My principal reason for~ voting ti this way was this was the very day 
that M}t the jury was being paneled and I felt we should maintain our confidentiality 
at least until the jury had been subquestioned. It surprised me how quiclly they 
did tfuis--got the jury organized, etc. The other reason way the possibility that we 
might defame etc. but this had less validity to me. 
I agree with Don Edwards in that we made a mistake on the day before, and will therefore 
have to live with it--we will have to release publicly what our ±witnesses say. 
The Republicans seem :tke to think they are rendering a services to the President by 
leaking this out--I don't believe this is the way it xmd: should be done. 
List of Witnesses 
Butterfield was the first witness. He explained his reason for each one of the witnesses 
none of which were material but narrow. So we really didn't get very far. During the 
lunch hour, I had an extensive conversation ii: with Hungate and Rodino. 
I feel that we got the strongest feelings on the floor debate of the 5-Minute Ruling. 
Also, during the debate of the 5-minute ruling--Rodino made a statement that we would 
call all of the witnesses we needed. 
Testimoni of Tuesday -- July 3rd Ellis Butterfield was the witness and on the stand 
all day ong. Rodino lectured on self-discipline which I think helped ultimately. 
No one asked a lot of questions. We went through all the sharade of oath and extending 
the right of council., which I felt is one of the things he did~ wrong. Everybody 
testifying in a situation like this ought to have a li lawyer. He chose not to have 
a lawyer--he was a good witness. He gave us his background- -he was a navy child and 
aspired to the naval academy and did not x make it and did not make iti in the air force. 
This was his career. His contact with Hatlaman goes back to :i:Ni:x their days at UCLA 
together. and I strongly suspect that :tke his association with Harlaman was closer 
because of the associatmon of thier wives. In any event,~ they had not seen each 
other for about 25 year. IR-1968,-Btltterfielcl-get-a-eall-frem In January of 1969, 
Butterfield got a call from Harlaman that he wanted him to do a job at the White HetlrseHouse. 
He told us something about his background that would have made him desireable. He had 
been a liaison ink the capital at the Air Force and worked in the White House in one 
capacity or another . My impression of him was a throughly competent administrator with 
an imagination (not a lot of humor) but a dedi cated , decent sorJ: of guy.that was career 
oriented but sort of reluctant of -----,,,-,-with the White House because of the challenge. 
I could not help but cover :tidE the cause of his testimony feeling that this guy was 
completely removed from the cover-up conspiracy. He acted candidly and honestly and in 
so doing--he did blow the whistle. I dont know why everyone else in the White House 
did not have the same attitude. If they had, we would never have escalated to the 
situation we are in. He spent a great deal of time going over the physical layout and 
diagramed the whole White House set-up. Strangely enough, this was the most interesting 
dRy we had, in t erms of t he overall view of how the White House operated. Her-ad not 
been there very long himself--he came in as an alternate for Harlaman really, but he 
worked into a better job as a traffic cop and had a close office to the President. 
My impression was that Butterfield thought he had a more :iDqli important job than he did--
he was not in on policy. -didn not form it nor there when they discussed it and I don't 
feel he comprehended a lot of it. I don't think he presumed that he was strong on 
politics--he just moved the papers around. Basically, his responsibility was to see that 
the office ran smoothly. It was interesting that he gave us a chart worked out on his 
own time of how the set-up was there . Apparently, there was no chart at all--just an 
administrative situation just developed and he took on the responsibility. Someone was 
guided but never bothered to put it down on paper. 
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He made a comment that he would be very fDik frank with us and he had not x taken into 
consideration the feeling of those who might have thought they were closer to the 
President than they actually were. The~ irony was that in so doing he was not as 
close to the President as he thought he was, but did not have enough humor to see this. 
One ironical thing was that Holoman eventually XN moved out of the office that that 
Sherman Adams had previously found. He made several reference to Sherman Adams and I 
think this was because he was in Washington himself when Eisenhour was there.(Butterfield 
was) 
Hellew Holloman was:x:x the closest man to the President and when they refer to 
Sherman Adams as the Assistant President -- he feels like Hollaman was every bit i of that. 
Then he interjected for no good reason that he wasn't detrothed--did not smile--just 
said it. The insight he gave us on the people involved was preety good. We had 
thought ~sfsiB from what was earlier said by John Doer that Gordon Strong 
was closer to Hollaman but I had the impression from this man that Higbie was really his 
alternate. The real difficult in entering the White House was getting into the 
President's circle because he was carefully p~otected himself. The thing I picked up 
on this was that Coasan apparently, in the spring of 1972 really started moving into 
the President's intercircle. Coasan £inched i his« job as Director of Communications. 
He took over Herbert Cline's job by adverse possession. His insight into Coason's 
gradual rise at the White House was interesting. He had personal shots at pretty much 
everyone there-- not malicious but just personal statements --he was pretty candid with 
this. The most interesting things is that we talked about Don Dean and that he was just 
another young boy in the White House and that he really didn't have the President's ear, 
until his moments in the sun--which is now pretty much hist~ry. But John Dean was 
the President's Counsel in title but Herlaman remained his counsel in fact and he keeps 
referring to John Dean as counsel to the staff and not the counsel to the President. 
During the three-years that John Dean was at the White House--Butterfield says that 
he clogged t.ge the President's motives four times. This has a lot of relevance I think 
because the priviledge communication between lawyer and cline would not stand up between 
the President and Dean. This goes back to our conversation whereas the President was 
chatting about the possibility of attorney and cline relationship. The thought crosses 
my mind then as it does not that the frequency of his ±RE interviews with Dean had 
certainly picked up,,and was related closely to the Watergate but may have also been 
related to build that lawyer-cline relationship that would give them a priviledge but 
that was abandoned--so it is pure fantasy on my part. 
My impression of this guy is that his miiixxr military---.---.-- is quite impressive and I'm 
impressed with it -- fuis poise and his command of his job and he is quite a competent 
XWtLiJaxx:t:Etti administrator but I felt that he was short on his imagination (but I may 
be wrong) . However, if the President was making monumental decisions in his presence, 
I think it was poor judgment on the President's part. (Butterfield) I don't feel like 
he could have contributed anything to them and this would be the basis for him wanting 
him there. We went through the whole thing in detail-- we described the President's papers 
and all of these things are settleties that were brought out in Ethe examination by~ 
Doer. He spent an awful lot of time doing an estimate of percentages that Hollaman spent 
in :tmf his office, and they were way out of proportion to the others. In 1972, Hollaman 
spent 72% of the staff time with the President and rest was divided between the others. 
The significant thing was tnat Coasan was improving his tir1e set-up but Holloman spent 
7 or 8 more time with the President than anyone else. 
Why would a withness go to all of this trouble to work this out? Ans: John Doer told 
him that this was the sort of evidence that we wanted from him -- he worked it out over 
the week-end after his interview with John Doer. This indicates to me that the staff 
now has a theory and they moving out of the ram of investigators to the ram of prosecutors. 
John Doer completed his colorless investigation of this guy and went into detail . 
(will get transcript and x go back to k this-I took extensive notes) Now that none of it 
~ really tied into it except that it established the staff system and how it worked, 
the physical lay-out and the ____ and this is what I feel it was all about. 
• 
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I watched~ Sinclair as he operated, he took his notes spasmodically. He zeroes 
in on what he thinks is relevant and relaxes what he didn't. However, his 
with him was a full-time note taker so I gNi::E guess they would come back a-n~a-a~i-sc_u_s_s_ 
this between time. Doer and Jenean took no notes during Sinclair's examination. (cross) 
Doer's examination x was the direct--he developed the whole case. 
Jenean stepped in --he was sharp with the witness and told hime not to guess which 
made him sound like one of the President's freiends. He wenti» into a lot of things 
that helped us a lot--I think we got an image of the President who uses his leisure 
time to work. Jenean and Doer boiled down heavily on the President's pre-occupation 
with his place in history , and his attention to detail. I don't think that his friend 
Butterfield-who xis N not a psychologist felt that his pre-occupation with detail was 
his concern about what history would say. I think he is the sort of guy which like 
:t:iaimcx things done right and if he has a dinner party, he would like to see it carried 
through correctly. Basically, his social insecurity comes from a guy who has x had 
limited social background and is not at home in that atmosphere and never will be. 
This is my analysis of it -- and it doesn't have a damn N thing to do with history. 
Butterfield pointed out that no man so preoccupied with his place in history would do 
anything that would damage his reputation which I thought was pertinent. 
Jenean really did the President in by the questionss taht that he asked at the end of 
his examination by Butterfield. Basically, his questions were directed to the line of 
whether Holaman made any decisions that the President was not consulted on, and he 
asked him several questions along this line obviously designed to illicit the response 
which he ultimately got which would be entirely out of character for Holoman to have 
done anything that the President had not been consulted on., and would be completely 
out-of-character. He said "I did not know Mr. Holaman to be a decision maker". 
This was the second lawyer that got this out of him--I don't know whether it was 
rehearsed or not. It was certainly inconsistent with the representation that the general 
made to us at the Republican Conference on m Monday that he felt Butterfield was not 
going to do anything harmful to the President and what he was going to say :wx:x: was along 
these lines--but he certainly indicated that he k would press Mr. Buttefield x on this 
point. I have reservations in my own mind as to whether this type of testimony will be 
evidence. For Jenean, I felt that it was not out-of-character but out of an inconsistent 
within responsibility and it indicates to me that he is a prosecutor--not an investigator. 
Sinclair picked up this particular point and went back to him and shook him. By the 
time Sinclair finished with him, he was reluctant to say anything morer than a guess. 
Sinclair shook the witness Butterfield in this regard. But he stuck to his opinion that 
"this was his view but he was not expert". My impression of Sinclair was an excellent 
examiner--he is so gracious to admit that he made a mink mistake that it is disarming. 
is still trying to pend him down or kick him around. She(?) stepped in there 
one time and raised some question (Sinclair was asking a question of the witness as to 
his previous testimony and Ms. Holston said "this is not the way you were -..---the 
testimony) and her objection was that--~· So Sinclair said very graciously x that he 
i did not want to :t do that--so he said to the witness "Do you recall your testimony 
on this point"? Of course, this led him right back to the point of where he was before--
but he did it in such a manner that Ms. Holston was pretty much in the dark. There was 
some exchange about guesses but I think Sinclair pretty well shook the main point fh6fC 
that Butterfield made that Holloman would not do anything without the President. This 
was pretty effective. 
After he finished, Rodino had to leave the chair and Hal Donahue took over. 
It amused me that Sinclair was through. When Sinclair had gotten all of the questions and 
answers out of the witnesses :ta that he wanted--he started asking other question. 
Then, he stopped--Rodino was not in the chair--Donahue was there so it was an appropriate 
time to raise his question. 
.. 
~-
Rodino said ''Mr. Chairman, I would like to know whether I will have a chance to examine 
the witnesses or not--It was like a bombshell! Someone went and got Rodino and he 
came back and sat beside our friend Donahue and there was never a firm ruling on it 
but I think we pretty well got the thing settled that he had received a wild-attitude in 
his examination and basically I think that we had a consensus that as long as he doesn't 
abuse it --there will not be a lot of objections raised and that's where we left it. 
I think Sinclair for practical purposes has the right to examine the witnesses pretty 
nruch any way he wants--he will Je hard to stop. 
Five Minute Ruling 
had had their say. 
we should exercise 
a lot of questions 
Before we could get a firm ruling from the chair, I think everybody 
Basically, I think Wiggin summed it up well saying that "I think 
a judgment here." When we got to the 5-minute ruling, there wasn't 
asked. 
My overall view of yesterday in terms of it fitting another nail in the President's ----is not apparent to me. Its subject to interpretation--if you are hostile to the 
President it clearly indicates what Butterfield said -- the President confided totally 
in Holaman and told hime to do all of the nasty things that were done. Conversely, 
if you are friendly to the President, then your view of it will be that Holaman and the 
President were totally unaware of what his staff was doing. Therefore, he can't be 
held accountable. So this is the substance of what is x taking place, it does make 
more significant the tapes of conversations between Holaman and the President which 
might be relevant to these questions but inasnruch as Holaman spent so much time with the 
* President, we have also weakened our right to supeona* because of the sheer value of 
the job such as going back to look at the justification to see if we really justify 
or know enough about these conversations to justify turning them over to us. 
But that could be .rissi critical, conversations between Holaman and the President in 
reference to these points. But if there wasn't any conversation on these points, the 
only way you can prove it is by listening to all of the President's tapes.and I don't think 
this is ssssRsa consistent with the presumption of innocence. 
Did you have a feeling somewhere in between the view that the President was totally 
insolated from this and the view that he and Harlaman was almost living together? 
No, I don't accept Butterfield's supposition--! don't think Butterfield is qualified or 
an expert in that field. I don't think he knew as much about the President as he thought 
he did. My complete reaction to it is that if Butterfield is an expert witness whose 
purpose is to divide the length between Earlanrnan? and the President through Harlanrnan 
then he has failed in that but it is an insight to the White House operation. 
You don't feel that the tables of statistics and charts and the number of meetings 
tended to do nruch to prove that Harlaman and the ~esident were involed? 
Not on the basis of the present information. Butterfield was a traffic cop, a lawkeeper 
and he kept things running smoothly-that was his job and not to make decisions and he 
wasn't there to be consulted on decisions. He isn't . even as close to k the operation 
as a Secretary would have been. He handled $350,00--he carried the bag and a friend 
of his lined up to disperse $350,000 whenever it was needed. This is the only dirty 
trick he was involved in and he was too dumb to know that it was illegal. 
This is one of the things that surprised me, obviously over the week-end he had prepared 
his testimony with instructions from Doer and Jenean. They wanted him to develop the 
point that N Nixon was a great detail man so he spent about 20 minutes telling us about 
details that the ~esident got involved in. Ex: The seating arrangement for dinner, 
the guest list - all social details-things of that nature which he probably ought not 
to have involved himself in. But if John Doer is instructing his witness that this is 




On yesterday which was July 9th between the between the time that John Mitchell was 
to begin testifying and almost the time Ni that we were to conclude the testimony of 
Whitman-- I ran into Hamilton Fisher and Tom Roosevelt talking about a scope up and 
they were rather xmrg shag about getting together--I joined the conversation partly 
by invitation and partly by agression. Basically, 'fm Tom Roosevelt said that those 
of us that are still on the fence should get together and f visit a little and he 
mentioned that Walter Flowers was pretty much in the same boat and we all agreed to 
do that. During the course of the conversation, we all handled the same problems. 
From the basis of this discussion, Hamiliton Fisher is not cormnitted to impeachment as 
we frequently read. He had applied earlier that his father was no Republican-Congressman 
in the pre and new deal era and his filing and putting ads in the newpaper to support 
the President has been reflected in his son's mail. 
Every time he put an ad in his son get criticism. 
The young people simply do not age-wise insist. on impeachment. They insist on defending 
the President at all cost. However, I think his friends are still the elderly 
-the elderly Republicans and they are his strongest supporters. Incidentally, Fisher 
made a cormnent which I thought was revealing as to his feelings. He said "There is 
no use trying to avoid a tragedy-its already a tragedy-the great American tragedy, there 
is no other way to look at it". 
We as lawyers have to find something we will be comfortable with--we can't resolve this 
thing on the basic public opinion-one way or the other. So we want to get together and 
I am sure we will shortly. After Roosevelt and me had walked off, he said to me 
"you know, you may not realize it but you meaning me and I meaning he and Walter Flowers 
are going to decide this thing as far as a Cormnitte is concerned Meaning, you and I 
have this thing is our hands. 
Bill Coahan is pretty much cormnitted to impeachment and Hamilton Casan is less cormnitted 
but almost there. Jim Mandox is beyond redemption and and the rest of them are not 
truly ----
Bid-Ree~evelt-iflclieate 
My conclusion is that if the three of us vote for impeachment and all of the Democrats 
it would reach SRssxif one-sided proportions and it would be difficult to beat it in 
House. However, if we vote against it (having put on such a show of this Judicious 
approach) and it split on the party line-we will be pursuasive in the numbers game. 
For that reason, I think it is critical . I think in the~ ·numbers game, if the party 
line splits--the possibilities of impeachment under those circumstances is slim. 
If the Southern Democrats (flowers) votes against impeachment and the vote end in 
something like 21-19, 18 or 17, this would mean that the Southern Democrats like Joe 
Wagner and the likes would go with the Republicans and that would be endangering the 
House. This would mean a close vote in the House and I think a close vote would be 
a tragedy. 
The Senate says they will not give a 2/3 majority for impeachment. Certainly, the 
Southern Senators would be reluctant to vote for removal. 
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John Rosen had no business talking about the President resigning and now he has 
reversed his position which I think was inappropriate. The first thing the 
Republican leadersfuip should be talking about is fair-play, presumption of 
innocence and reserved judgment and get into this fight for all of the evidence in 
the end and join in all these courses of criticism of the ti Judiciary Committee. 
It shakes my confidence in him to advise me in this particular situation--I think 
he is a very able and honest guy but I think his j:NN view of his job is such that 
it would not be helpful to me. 
The judgment I have most respect for is my wife and I have talked to her about it 
and she is inclined to change her mind about this matter almost as often as I do. 
I guess I'm influenced a good deal by Bill Cohen because he sets next to me in the 
Committee but he has an reaction of :tlra:tsaS~$SSsst a prosecutor because he is 
suspicious of most witnesses. · On the other hand, he is so wrapped up in his 
~bernatorial operations(governor of Maryland) and he has been sweating that out 
for several weeks or months and now he finally made an announcement. Its hard for 
him to concentrate on what's going on now but he's pretty good in his analysis. 
He pretty suspicious of Doer and Jenean and he certainly demonstrates a limited 
capacity in the experience wP, have had over him in the last few days of examining 
witnesses. Jenean and Doer are the two most lavorious examiners 
I have ever seen in my life -they are masters of direct examination. 
In the Republican Conference before our first meeting with witnesses, we asked 
"how in the world can Butterfield take a whole day" and Jenean said well you will have 
to understand that Mr. Doer is a very slow and particulous examiner. ~ However, 
Jenean is the :iaexp:: worst examiner I have ever seen-when examining O'Brian and also 
, he want to know the size of the envelope the money it was carried in, 
~ho_w_m_a_n_y_e-nv-e-lopes, what color was the envelope, who carried it and just that degree 
of examination. It may be relevant and I'm sure we can connect it up some day but 
at this moment we can't. 
We have been asking John Doer for many days now to give us his theory of impeachment 
and I think this is important as we go forward in the examination to know what the 
theories are that our examiner have behind them and this has been promised to us long 
ago by Doer and Jenean and they keep telling us they haven't gotten around to it. 
I don't want to accept the theory but I want to know what they are trying to come up 
with and what exactly they have in mind in terms of arguments of impeachment with the 
facts that we now have if you are inclined to impeach and this is where we are at the 
moment--we can't get it out of them. 
The other thing that is confronting us now is the Supreme Court's decision on this 
~....--.---,case. I mentioned before that I read the ~-~on this and I felt that Ja-was-ke? 
had the better of the argument and I'm quite sure the Supreme Court will tell the 
President to raise those tapes and I don't think we have any business making a judgment 
on impeachment until we have the beRfit-ef-these- - tapesbenefit of those tapes. We may 
run into some type of a showdown before the Supreme Court makes this decision and the 
majority are ready to go forward with~ impeachment yet these critical 
questions are hanging out. 
It seems as if you have changed your position on this. 
The reason I revised my trui.Ying on this is probably my conversation with Roosevel and 
Fisher yesterday, we made such a Lshow of adverse interest for non-compliant that we 
may very well find ourselves in a position where we may have to rely on those adverse 
interests between the time we vote on it in the Committee and the time it comes off 
for consideration on the floor-the question would have been resolved and that I think 
would be a poor situation to be in to have indulged an interest and then have·· the jnterest 
blown out of the water by Presidential action. 
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I think I want to raise the same question that Wiggins raised and that is"when are we 
going to get the t apes." 
JJid you get any sense of how the oral arguments went or how the people thought it went? 
I think everybody thought Ja-was-kee's man (Jacobe) did a good job but lack of 
and then he forgot to sign the brief too. Sinclair they f elt was pretty adroit-b~u~t-..,,,I-
judged f rom the feelings of the Committee's also that the decision was pretty drear. 
I was surprised to see the Washi~gton Post editorializi ng on the arguments and I think 
it was in poor taste. 
Sinclair does a far better j ob than-1Jenean and Doer of examin~ng witnesses - he doesn't 
just bore you to death. 
Have you split into the Task Force? 
Yes, But I have not done anything in my task force- my task force's responsibility is 
our friend (Se-gre-ta). 
What are the first personal face7to-face contact you have ever had with Richard Nixon? --- --..... 
I'v~ aci--face-to-face contact with R. ichard Nixon prior to the time I came to Wasb.J:ngton. 
JI:Y1. ~60 when I was the Roanoke City Chairman, he came to Roanoke City and I had a 1'0-t_ to 
do with planning that event. Particularly,----~ the stadium and getting the pla:-tform 
organized. In 1965 he campai gned for Lenwood Holton for Governor and I made all of the 
arrangements. I was the :Master of Ceremony one day for about 3,000 , 000 at a breakfast 
and luncheon in Norf©~k · - Lunch in Staunton and Harrisburg and dinner in Rome, Also, 
he came to Roanoke when Lenw0od was campaigning in 1969 and I had to preside over and be 
the editor on the civic side. This is the origin of Nixon's favorite master of ceremony. 
is the way he idezyfifies you. 
I that we shouldn't impeach if we fe ±reSenate wasn't 
going to r emove • ~ because of what I said befo ea certain amount of 
discretion as to whkther we want to :unpeac or not because it is up to the Senate because 
it is a judgment called upon Raybond? as well as ours. 
Let's take a set ' f uncontestable provable facts, its still a km judgment as to the whether 
the House think He should be impeached or proving crime. Its still a matter of judgment 
as to whet her the House think he should be impeached and its also a matter of the Senate's 
judgment as to whether he should be removed--its di scretionary to that degree- he may be 
impeached or re~oved from office for a high crime or he does not have to be. 
manda'Jw.sly 
Its nobody you i an hir:¥ts a representative to impeach the President or can you mandamus 
the Senate tor move him from office--that's discretion. They can say that all the facts 
are not true an we don't think he should be removed and that's it. 
Guilty means th~acts are proven and he ought to be removed. What I'm saying is that 
what the Senate is going to do ought not be determined by what the House is going to 
do- so we should not speculate on the Senate (what's its going to do). 
I think it would H a useless exercise. 
~ f)..n~ ,___ ~~ v"\ -  
Page 1 Tape of July 3 on meeting of 6/25/ 74 
B We opened up the sally of Wiley Maine who wanted disclosure of all the 
milk contributions to the members of the Congress prior to the legislation 
which was in question or with reference to the President's involvement. 
Danielson 'nff~red a point of order and he was getting ready to argue 
when Jack ~ ; suggested that the motion to table so we could go on and 
get disposed of it and voted down and that would be the end of it. 
The motion to table was defeated by a vote of 15-21 which meant that 
Jack Brook's strategy had backfired and we had to talk about it a little 
bit. The significance of this was that there was real lack of organiza-
tion on the Democratic majority side and Jack Brook's isn't as popular 
as his big mouth would indicate. This is the second day in a row 
where Bill Hungate voted with the Republicans and I saw him going 
back and suggested - the earlier vote dealt something of mine that 
escapes me at the moment. When I moved to strike the supoena for the 
President - the daily news summaries - he was the only one who voted 
with the Republicans on that one- so this is the second day in a row 
he's voted with the Republicans and he said he thought we were right 
but he didn't remember why - that was all I could get out of him. 
Some erosion in the Democratic party ... not much here - Jack Brooks 
is not going to be able to bulldoze that crowd by just being rude. 
Ed Hutchinson surprised me by jumping into the breach here on the motion 
- on the ~EN.± point of order by saying that it ~Emx came too late, which 
it did. - My notes escape me here because I had thought that I would 
have the transcripts in front of me and I don 1 t know where it is but 
the problem of reconstructing with limited notes but -
The thing that struck me as interesting here was the lack or party 
organization on the Democratic party side. And so Hutchinson did 
seep into the breach and argue that the point of order wasn't timely 
made but they skipped that by going to this motion to table of Jack 
Brooks and then that was defeated and then Rodino has the expression 
that the motionwhich was to disclose the milk contributions was not 
germain to our resolutions. He had that opimion but he didn't rule 
it out of order - if I remember it correctly. I think Ray Thornton 
probably made the argument of the democrats that it was a question 
of whether the promise of money was a factor im the Presidentts 
decision or not. Well, I think thatts an oversimplification of it -
the plain fact is that the press.dent was being subjected to a whole 
lot of pressure from the Congress for the same reason that they are 
now saying that the President - they are now suggesting that the 
President made his decision on the same basis that the Congress had 
placed its pressure. So I felt like it was relevant but this was a 
straight party line vote on this motion and - I thought it was 
relevant for the Committee to know that the president was being 
subjected to pressl.R'es from Congress. The pressure from the Congress 
came from the same sources they are now suggesting that the pressure 
to the President came from - only the accumulated effect of it somewhere 
along the line makes it clear that it was a political decision and a 
bribe and I think it was a little bit unnecessary cause I don't think 
anybody - seriously at this moment - was pushing the milk fund - now 
that may get into the picture before we get through simply as one of 
the things thatts thrown in there but standing alone - it wouldn't get 
very far. 
Now when we got to the questinn of do we want to go into executive 
session because the rules provide that we cantt release our informatio~ 
without voting ourselves into Executive Session and Edwards believes 
that it should be public--------~ whenever possible but he 
doesntt want to go in - until we get to that point of the discussion 
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B that was basically his argument. I think maybe that 1 s probably right but 
we really didn 1 t have that choice. The choice was to go into executive 
session and I had to vote for it simply because - princip!lly because 
Chuck Wiggins said that as far as he was concerned - when we got into 
executive session - we were going to talk about it - the possibility of 
defaming these people and you know under the rules, we had to go in. 
My view of it that we wasted an awful lot of time. But anyway we went 
fnto executive session and the purpose of this session was to discuss 
what witnesses we would call. 
Now w everybody knows all about that . The thing that disappointed me 
is when we got in there and talked and when we got through I really 
don 1 t think we revealed anything that we w could not have discussed 
publically and this is a factor - as I realize - that it would be nice 
to~ go into executive session but we really m.ven 1 t got basis for 
justifying it except the fact that our people talk too much - in 
public - and that takes time. 
Incidentally - for example - in our session of July 2nd - when we still 
had the 5 minute rule and there was a good deal of restraint exercised 
and we got out of there pretty quickly. If it had been public under the 
5 minute rule, I think we 1 d be there yet. 
Basically the arguments that took place and the votes on the Committee 
WRERZ~EREX~ during this time were pretty clearly along the party line 
theory that the republicans are entirl ed - I mean - excuse me - the 
party line vote. The republicans feeling that the president is entitled 
to have every witness that he wants and some otherRs which we thought. 
I voted this way every time. 
This is the day that Wiggins stated that we were going to discuss 
sensitive matters. The thin& that he was concerned about was that 
the President speculated on the John Mitchell several times in the 
course of his conversation. The~ speculated on the theories in which 
obstruction of justice would be involved and a few things of that nature 
and he didn 1 t want this to get out because the x~xi trial is set for 
September 4th - or it may be the 7th - in Washington - and that 1 s the 
John Mitchell case involvin§ all of these guys and that 1 s the one that 1 s 
before the Supreme Court. o he was concerned about that but we kicked 
it around and evenaually voted to release it - to release the information 
in support of the motion that was made by Kastenmeir - that right, the 
total presentation of evidence - and my notes don 1 t even reveal who 
made that motion - the idea being that Rodino would release it a volume 
at a time as its printed and it should come out like today or~ tomorrow -
portions of it and my view of it was that it was prejudicial and I 
didn't want to do it but the Committee made that decision and we 1 re 
sort of stuck with it now. 
On June 26th - the day that we Voted to discuss the witnesses. (June 25th 
was on the presentation of evidence) Right - and 1 111 just have to go 
back and clean that up. 
It didn 1 t seem to me like we were making - we were doing a lot of 
talking and accomplishing very little. On the 26th was - Thornton 
made the motinn to call the vital witnesses. I couldn 1 t help observing 
that it was prepared for him - they just passed motions down the line 
and it got to be his turn but he made a nice presentation and he put 
it together all right. But it did limit the number of witnesses pretty 
severely to 4 or 5 and then they had class 2 witnesses which would 
be reinterviewed and then called if the majority members - the minority 
Page 3 M/25 /? li ·7/s/7/ 
B felt it was necessary after consultation with the staff. Well this 
is probably necessary to hold back - to limit the nwnber of witnesses. 
I thought it was pretty severe. 
Then we went into axx an executive session. There was an argwnent 
about whether we would discuss this motion to call witnesses in public 
session or privately. Thornton moved that we go into the executive 
session and there were a few comments on it and the vote was 25 to 13 to 
do that. Now my principle reason for v0ting to close the meeting is 
this w~s the very day th~t E~lichmanrs ~ury ~as_bein~ ~pane~ed and I 
felt like we ought to maintain our confJ.dentiality/tlh.t:i:IaEflichmanrs 
jury had been sequestered and that surprised me how quickly they did 
do that - got the jury organized and so forth. And the other reason 
was that the rule that the possibility that we might defame and so 
forth but that has less validity to me as the leakers get more potent. 
W In other words you think the defamation is going on anyway. 
B Defamation is going on. Thatrs it exactly. But the security is better 
than the world believes. I kinda agree with Don Edwards comment that 
we made a mistake on the day before but we have to go along with it 
but he doesnrt like it and werve got to learn to live with that because 
eventually werre going to have to release all of this - go public on 
what our witnesses say. 
W You donrt buy Fordrs comment that this is the leakest committee in the 
history of the Congress ... 
B ell, hers been here longer than I have - and certainly the leaks are 
~nexcuseable and I donrt know - nobody seems to be willing to hide it 
anymore. The republicans who think they are doing a service to the 
president by leaking the stuff - I think - are pretty narrow in their 
view of it. I just donrt believe thatrs the way it ought to be done. 
Werre in the business and we just have to take all this crap. werve 
got some weak horses and itrs their constituents fault - not ours. 
w 
Jenner made the possibility that the ex:weNeR information tends to degrade 
or defame and that was kinda jurisdictional finding that we had to have. 
But when somebody makes that statement then werre going on ix in. Then 
he went into the list of witnesses. Butterfield was the first witness. 
And that surprised me a little bit. We learned and of course, what 
Butterfield was going to have to say from the - later-because he testified 
and dictated this memorandwn - but basically I donrt think he can serve 
us at all as to what hers going to have to say. He explained his reasons 
for each one of the witne5ses - none of which were really mx±REial mature - pretty narrow. owe really didnrt get very far except to kick 
it around. 
And then during the lunch hour - I had an extensive conversation with 
Hungate and Rodino. Now havenrt I been over this before? 
I thmnk so - now letrs see - to kinda throw it g together at the point 
where you stopped at the debate over the - who should be called as a 
witness and the attempt by some of the democrats tolimit the number 
of people being called and there was some danger that the bipartisan 
inquiry nature - bipartisan nature of the inquiry - I guess thatrs 
blt'e~kinsu it down. 
Well, during this day - the 26th - we had all these things about witnesses 
that eventually divide on a 19-19 vote. Now thatrs the 26th. 





There wasnTt much 0Nsxz~sx on the 26th on the wrangling over the ... 
I dirlnTt feel like± it was bitter. Then weTve already talked about 
the floor debate on the 5 minute rule. Now thatTs when I felt like 
it~ the feeling w got the strongest during that period. Now, I was 
probably wrong - yesterday·, as an example, why we didn rt abuse the 
5 min. rule but if we go public, I think we will. Now the thing -
the other thingx - is that during the discussion of the 5 min. rule 
or during the debate of it, why, Rodino also made a tement that 
eTpe · all he was ed 
ou-t-.on that - in effect , accepted the republicans ~position on that -
the majority has,so on the basis of that whatever bi tterness th1ttrs 
there is gone because Rodino has done it again - if he feels like 
therers a partisan split, he goes home and ~a prays over it or something 
and comes back and figures out some way to gracefully acceed to it 
which is one of the techniques he may have learned from the president 
in dealing with the Committee and Jaworski but - no I donTt feel that 
therers that partisan rankor there but I will say that I read the 
Washington Post this morning about the comment the democrat view versus 
the pepublican view of Bntterfieldrs testimony. All of the democrats 
came out of there swearing that Butterfield has linked the president 
through Haldeman to all the conspiracies but I had exactly the opposite 
" . JJTipression. 
Butterfield was the witness and he was on the stand all day long. Rodino 
o ened with a little lecture on self disci line which I think hel~ 
ultJJTiately in that we ourselves N down to the 5 min - no o asked 
a whole lot of questions. This is the first witness so we went all the 
sharade of oath and extending him the right to counsel. ThatTs one of 
the things I think he probably did wrong - everybody testifying in a 
situation like this ought to have a lawyer. Especially since werve 
gotten so perjury happy at these things. But he chose not to have a 
lawyer. He was a good witness. He g1t1e gave us his background - he 
was a Navy child and had aspried to the Navy Academy and didnrt make 
it but did make it in the Air Force and so that was his career. His 
contact with Haldeman goesback to their days at UCLA together and I 
strongly suspect that his association with Haldeman was closer because 
of the associa~on with their wives. They had met one another at UCLA. 
But in any event, they hadnrt seen each other for about 25 years and 
i o a c rom - in January of 1969, go a ca 
from Haldeman that he wanted his old friends - wan n the 
job at the White House and of course, he told us about his background 
which was such that it would have made him desirable. Herd been 
liaison in the Capitol for the Air Force and worked in the White House 
in one capacity or another so he had a background that was probably 
desirable but you canTt overlook the asswnption that this is part of 
Haldeman assembling his old friends in the White House in Washington. 
And that was certainly what he had in mind with Butterfield. My 
impression of him - was a thoroughly competent administrator, pretty 
limited imagination, not a whole lot of humor, but dedicated, decent 
sort of guy that was career oriented and probably reluctantly went 
to the White House to accept the challenge. And of course, I couldnTt 
help during the course of± his testimony, feeling that this guy was 
ompletely removed from the coverup conspiracy. I t wasn' t a"lluwed to 
[S!UCh him and he was - he act ed canc!1d1y and. h onestly and cour se he 
r1;r1 blow the whis tle and so doing , he blew the w But- I donT t 
w y every o ye se in e ouse couldnTt have had the 
same attitude - if they had - why werd never have escalated to the 
situations werre in. He spent a great deal of time going over the 
physical layout. He diagramed the Whole White House setup and strangly 





terms of advancing the impeachment inquiry but just in terms of the 
information, the general view he gave you of how the White House 
openated. 
He hadn 1 t been there very long himself. He came in as sort of an 
alter-ego for Haldeman, really and he sort of worked into a better 
job as sort of a traffic cop and had a close - office in close 
proximity to the president and he was at his beck and call. I could 
not avoid the impression that Butterfield aarixzkex:im thought he had 
a more important job than it looks like he did. That he wasn 1 t in 
on policy, he wasn 1 t forming it, wasn 1 t there when they discussed it 
and I 1 m sure he comprehended a whole lot of it. And I don 1 t think 
he presumed it - to say that he was strong on policy. He was - he just 
moved the papers around but somebody had to do that - somebody wmo you 
could trust and I tliink they chose well for the job. Basically his 
responsibility was to see that the office ran smoothly. I was interested 
to find that no chart - he gave us a chart - worked out in his own 
mind, on his own time - of just how the setup was there but apparently 
there wasn 1 t any chart at all - it just sort - administrative situation 
just developed and the responsibilities sort of followed - took 
on the responsibilities as your information was and somebody was guided 
_ hu_t nobody w every bothered to put it down on paper. I was surprised 
that it developed in that fashion. He made a comment that he was being 
very frank with us, that he hadn 1 t taken into consideration the feelings 
of those who might have thought they were elmer to the president than 
they actu~ were. Well, the irony of this was that, in so doing, he, 
it became apparent to me that he wasn 1 t quite as close to the president 
as he thought he was but he didn 1 t have enough humor to see that. 
Far and away - oh, the one ironical thing was that Haldeman eventually 
moved down into the office that Sherman Adams had previously £ENmi had 
and he made several references to Sherman Adams. Now I think that was 
because he was in Washington himself when Eisenhower was there. But 
he said Haldeman was far and away the closest man to the president and 
you know, they uiix called Sherman Adams the assistant president - and 
he feels like Haldeman was every bit of that. Then he interjected, for 
no good reason, that he wasn 1 t Deep Throat. Didn 1 t smile - just said 
it. The insight that he gave us into the people involved was pretty 
good. We had thought from what was earlier said by John Doar that 
Strone was - Gordon Strone - was closer to Haldeman but I had the 
impression from this man that Higbee was his alter-ego and not Strone. 
as we went along - that Colson in 
his own. When he first came - the 
was getting 
Kline out pretty clearl~ . - e -
i t Hi· L-!:i.Heh . flndt 7 s Jo 46.s Director of Communications. Herb Kline -
yes, thatss right . He took over Herbert .Kl!ne'§ Job by adverse 
possession and just sort of incroached and he didn 1 t say he was ruthless 
about it but he did say he was agressive and effective. His insight 
into Colson 1 s gradual rise at the White House, I think was interesting. 
He had personal shots at pretty much everybody there - not malicious but 
just personal statements and I don 1 t think I 1 ll go into all of that 
but just - he was a pretty candid witness. But the most interesting 
thing was when he talked about John Dean, it became perfectly apparent 
+-1,,,,+- .Tnhn np::rn rn;:i1C: -inst- anoither voun2: bov EN in the White House. 
/;",/ 
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B That he really didn 1 t have the president's ear. When pressed - this 
is Butterfield talking about Dean. John Dean never really had the 
president's ear up until his moment in the sun which is now pretty muc~ 
history. But John Dean was the president 1 s counsel in title but Erlichman 
remained his counsel in fact and he keeps referring to John Dean as 
ounsel to the staff and not the counsel to the president because during 
t 3 that John Dean was at the White House, ButterY:rela says ~ ~( 
~ he doesn
1 t know that he sa~ t e presi en m ~,----:---:-~ · ~s-dnr:i:ng that 
whole peciod,. This has a lot of relevance I t h ink because certa~ 
t heprivileged communication between lawyer and client wouldn't stand 
up between the president and Dean. And you remember this goas back 
to our conversation this morning - that we listened to when the president 
was chatting about the possibility of attorney-client relationship 
and that was clearly not there. The thought crossed my mind then 
as it does mow now - that f~e:~mnrtl~ the frequency of his interviews 
with Dean had suddenly picked up - was related of course to the Watergate 
but it also might have been related to an effort to build a lawyer-client 
elationship that would give them a privilege but eventually that was 
abandoned and so that 1 s pure fantasy on my part - it was an observation 
- a thought that crossed my mind at the time. 
He's not very crazy about McGruder - well he said he was a 100% PR man 
and he didn't have anything to do - he was an image builder - eager, 
aggressive. 
My feeling about the guy is that his x military training is quite 
apparent and I 1 m impressed with his poise and his command of his job 
and he's quite a competent administrator but I felt like he was short 
on imagination but I may be wrong cause it's really not quite fair but 
that 1 s making a judgement but that certainly my impression. But if 
the president were c onfjdjng .., we:ri€! making mmouroental deci smnns in 
his presence, I think it would have been poor judgement on the president 1 s 
part ... of Butterfield. Bedause I don't think he would have contributed 
,-anything "'tu them and that's the basis on which he would want him there 
and so it closed out on later testimony which I'll comment on in a 
minute. 
Then we went through the whole shebang about many times - in some detail -
~ 
described the pre.s.iden:t..1-S papers and -al.L of these things are subtleties 
ha~ ought out in the examination by Doar that don't impress me 
t but he spent an awful lot of time in the percentages - est:iriTI!te 
of the percentagex of time that Haldeman spent in the president's office 
and it was way out of proportion to the others. In 1972, Haldeman spent 
72% of the staff x time with the president and the rest of it was divided 
up with ±kex0xhREX all the others. Now the significant thingx that 
Colson was improving his time setup but Haldeman was 7 or 8 times more 
time with the president than anybody else. 
Why would a witness go to all this trouble to work this out? Well, the 
answer is that John Doar told him that that's the sort of evidence that 
we wanted from him. 
W He had it though. 
B He had it - he'd worked it up over the weekend - after his interview 
with John Doar. It just indicates to me that staff now has a theory 
and they 1 re shor ing up the theory and they're moving out of the realm 
of investigators into the realm of prosecutors and I xxk think its 
premature and inappropriate but I didn't say so at the time but that's 
my judgement. It makes me suspect of what we might now get from John 
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B Doar and Albert Jenner. John Doar completed his colorless examination 
of this guy and he went into detail and great detail and I donrt think 
this is necessary to go into that - I 1ll get a transcript and go back 
to it - I took extensive notes but none of it really tied into± it 
except that it established the staff discipline and how it worked 
~ 
and thephysical layout in the House. That :wxx what I felt all of it 
was all about 
I watched St. Clair while he operated. He took his notes sort of 
spasmodically. He zeroes in on what he thinkgs is relevant and then he 
relaxes when it isn 1 t. But Mccahill, with him, he 1 s a full time note 
taker and then they come back and discuss it, I guess, between times. 
Doar and Jenner took no notes during :tkR St. Clair 1 s cross examination. 
Doar 1 s examination was the direct, I guess you 1 d call it. He developed 
the whole case and then I thought we were going to move to my friend 
St. Clair but then Jenner stepped in. Jenner didn 1 t question him long. 
He was aharp with the witness in telling him not to guess which made 
him sound like he was one of the president 1 s friends. He went into a 
lot of things that didn 1 t help us a lot. I think we got an image of the 
president as a - who uses his leisure time to work - and he dmesn 1 t 
have much spare time and I think we bore - Jenner and Doar bore down 
heaviliy on the president 1 s - 0Nz±lmzwi±:0.Rss and on the witness as a 
result of that probably - on the president 1 s ~R preoccupation with his 
place in history and his attention to detail. I don 1 t think that our 
friend Butterfield who is not a psychologist felt that his preoccupation 
with detail was his concern with what history would say about him. I 
think it 1 s just the sort of guy that likes to do things right and if 
he has a dinner party, he wants the dinner party done right. Sort of 
a basic social insecurity, he comes a guy, he 1 s had limited social 
background, he 1 s just not at home in that atmosphere - never will be 
and that 1 s my analysis of it and it doesn 1 t have a dmmn thing to do 
with history. But Butterfield bore down on it pretty heavily and then 
the lawyer that got it out of them. Well, St. Clair turned that around 
very cleverly when he got to it. Pointed out that no man so preoccupied 
with his place in history would do anything that would~ da.magie 
his reputation - which I thought was pertiaent. Jenner , though . really 
did us in - did the resident in - b the questic}ns he the➔ 
~ _ is examination of Butter eld. asica y is question was directed 
l i ne of di d the president - di d Haldeman make any decisions that 
tlE pEssident was not consulted on and he asked him several questions 
along this line - obviously designed to illicit the response which he 
ultimately got that it would be entirely out of character for Mr. Haldeman 
to have done anything that the president had not been consulted on -
it would be completely out of character and he emphasized out of character. 
He s - TT · know Mr. Haldeman to be a decision maker.TT Now 
this was the second lawyer that got a ou o im. on n w whether 
that was rehearsed or not but it 1 s certainly inconsistent with the 
representations that Jenner made to us at the republican caucus on Monday. 
That he(Jenner) felt like Butterfield was - well, that Butterfield was 
not going to do anything harmful to the president and that was he was 
going to say was along these lines but certainly he didn 1 t indicate 
to us that he was going to press Mr. Butterfield on this point and I 
donrt think as the minority counsel - I mean, even though he was an 
investigator, it was such a leading question and such a, well, such a 
judgement, well, I don 1 t think anybody would admit that testimony. That 
would be my judgement on it - I don 1 t think, although they lay the 
foundation, I still have reservations in my own mind whether that sort 
of thing would be evidence but for Jenner and the republican counsel 
to do it, I felt like was not out of character but inconsistent with his 
esponsibility and it indicates to me that he 1 s not - he 1 s a prosecutor 
n+ an irn,oc+icr~+n~ 
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B Well, St. Clair - the ball ~as quickly thrown to St. Clair and of course 
it picked up this particular point and went back to it and shook him. 
Well, by the time St. Clair had gotten through with him, he was reluctant 
to say anything was anything more than a guess. St. Clair made him 
admit - as I mentioned before - about the percentages of time that 
Haldeman s~ent - just made himself point out that all of these things 
about percentages that we discussed before - St. Clair made Butterfield 
just - shook his statement in this Eegard. I think he adhered to it. He 
stuck to his view that that was his opinion but he was no expert. 
My impression of St. Clair was excellent examiner - when he, hefs so 
gracious about admitting that hefs made a mistake - that itfs disarming. 
Liz Holtzman is still trying to pin him down - to kick him around, as it 
were - and she stepped in there one time and raised some question about -
St. Clair was asking a question of the witness as to his previous testimony, 
and Liz Holtzman said NRk well, thatfs not the way, youfre misxakiNgxtkex 
t2sxim0N~ misstating the testimony and her objection was - so St. Clair 
says well, very graciously, that he certainly doesn't want to do that and 
so he says to the witness, do you recall your testimony on that point 
and of course led him right back to the point where he was before but 
he did it in such a manner that Liz Holtzman was whistling in the dark 
sorta. There was some exchange about guesses but I think St. Clair 
pretty well shook the main point that Butterfield made that Haldeman 
[j
ouldnft do anything without the president . . §o that was pretty effective 
thought, and I went away fl?gm tl:Je thing - 1.± that' s the only thing 
e-can hook t he president on ~ he f sJXLD.:t'...e.:t..t,¥.._ good shape. 
- -----fter he got through, during the course of Sr . Clairfs examination 
Rodino had to leave the chair and Harold Donahue took over. Well, it 
amused me that St. Clair, finally after he had finished, and there had 
been objections about cross-eRamination and quite ob"fiously, he had 
ross examined and no body had effectively stopped him and he was 
through. (Well, there were several tries hut not many - well, just what 
Ifd always said is that if he doesnft get too far out of line, that 
wefre going to let him get away with it. And thatfs exactly the way it 
was handled. And beautifully handled. I mean St. Clair didnft push 
J /l us too far. Then when he got through and he f d gotten aN all the questions 
V · and answers out of the witness that hefd wanted, then he started in 
on asking some other questions but then he stopped and Rodino was not 
in the chair. Donahue was there so it was the perfect time to raise 




Well, I felt like St. Clair when hefd gotten to the end of his questions 
ing thought it was a great time to bring this hhing to a head about 
just what the limitations were going to be on his examination - Rodino 
was out of the chair andDonahue was in the chair so he said now, Mr. J 
Chairman, I want to know whether Ifm going to have the right to cross 
examine the witness es or not - just kinda dropped it like a bombshell. 
And caught - Rodino wasnft there - well, they had a hurried - somebody 
ran out and got Rodino and he came back and sat there beside our friend 
Donahue, and i:t he never really got a rirm ruling on it but I think 
we pretty well got the thing settled that he had received pretty wide 
latatude in his examination and basically I think we kinda had a concensus 
that as long as he does-1 ft abuse it, there won't be a lot of objections 
raised and thatfs where we left it and I think St. Clair for practical 
purposes has got the right now to examine the witnesses pertty much any 
way he wants to and nxsx itfs going to hard to stop him. 
We then went into the 5 mi nute rule -
W He (St. Clair) did this by carefully going :a:iu along .... 







He asked all the questions he was going to ask and nobody questioned 
him really. Nobody effectively questioned him. And then every now and 
4en somebody would nit-pick a little bit. He 1 d very graciously say, well, 
I 1 ll ask the question a different way or something. Then he got all his 
questions asked and then he threw down the gauntlet and before we could 
get a firm ruling from the chair, everybody had had their say and basically 
I think Wiggins swnmed it up pretty well, he says we just got to exercise 
a little judgement here. We all know what 1 s going on and we all know 
that we 1 re just going to have tolive with it but if everybody 1 s going 
to raise objections we 1 Tl have a 15 min. harangue over every question, 
we 1 ll never get anywhere. So I think we kinda agreed by concensus that 
we would live with it which is what I 1 ve said all along - that the 
ommittee 1 s going to be reasonable and he 1 s going to be reasonable 
and we 1 re going to get the thing over :bci. with. 
So when we got to the 5 min rule, surprisingly enough, there weren 1 t 
a lot of questions asked. Here again I think the democrats had gotten 
together in their caucus and agreed we won 1 t have a whole lot of 
questions. Not maybe in caucus but hhere wasn 1 t anything brought out 
in questinging by comnittee members that contributed to the sum total 
ofknowledge. So I felt like I was right in the beginning - that we 
don 1 t need examination by committee when we 1 ve got that good a staff 
working down there and St. Clair. 
if this 
My overall view of yesterday in terms of -/is xkix another nail in the 
president 1 s coffin - it 1 s not apparent to me. It 1 s subject to both 
interpretation, if you are hostile to the president, clearly it indicates 
what Buttefield said, the president confided totallybin Haldeman and 
vica~ersa and theLpresident told Haldeman to do all the nasty things 
that were done. Conversely, if you are friendly to the president, your 
view of it would Be that the president was totally insulated from what 
his staff was doing and therefore he can 1 t be held accountable. So that 1 s 
the substance of what had taken place. I L does make more significant 
the tapes of conversations between Haldeman and the president wh i c h might 
be -relevan t 'to t-tres-e-ques tions -. - 13ut much as Haldeman s1-1ent s ei 
m nt 1 - ened our ri ht to u btain 
sub oenas - it seems to- me-- becaus 
I 1 m going ac o oo at the justifications to see if we really justify 
- know enough about these conversations to justify turning them over 
to us. Cause from what Butterfield said, Haldeman was living with the 
president but it is important - I mean that could be critical conversations 
with the president and Haldeman on reference to these points but if there 
wasn 1 t any such conversation on that point~ tbe anJy way you can prove it 
is by listening to all of the presidents tapes and I don 1 t think that 1 s 
con sistent wi t h the presumption of innocense. 
Did you have the feeling - somewheEe between the view that the president 
was totally insulated 0»zxhxs from some of this and the view that he 
and Haldeman were almost living together. 
Well, no, I don 1 t accept Butterfield 1 s supposition. I don 1 t think 
Butterfield is qualified as an expert in that field. I don 1 t think he 
knew as much about the president as he thought he did and my complete 
reaction to it is, that if Butterfield is an expert witness whose purpose 
is to provide the link between Erlichman and the president through 
Haldmman, then he has failed in that. But it is an insight to the White 
House operation - as to how it worked. 
You don 1 t feel that the tables~£ and statistical charts and the logs 
and the number of meetings and so on really tended to do much to prove 
that Haldeman and the president .•. 




Not on the basis on my present inforrration but I don 1 t have to decide 
yet - so I don 1 t. 
Mainly because you didn 1 t feel that Butterfield was an expert witness 
on that .•• 
I just think Butterfield - I don 1 t think Butterfield - he wasn 1 t there. 
He was a traffic cop - that 1 s right a log Rk keeper. And he kept things 
running smoothly - that was j his job but he wasn 1 t there to make decisions. 
He wasntt there to be consulted on decisions cause he didnrt have any 
knowledge or background that would help him make decismnns. I mean hers 
well, hers not even as close to the operation as a secretary would have 
been,.- Hers there with the frequency of a janitor but thatts about it. 
think Butterfield is a nice guy well meanin I donr , maybe 
.: ..:, ..:,.: ------ - -- - - '::),. n nnn TT- ---·-ied t he hag for them. 
erse the $350,000 
henever i :t was nsede.d and he lined him up and Look h.iJn th~ 
dirty trick he was involved in and he was too dumb 
i1£ega l So t bat' s anot.fl:er--e'X'O:fflPle of the ~ Y-
Herets one of the things that upset me - not upset me but surprised 
me - obviously over the weekend he had prepared his testimony in 
instructions from Doar and Jenner. They wanted himto develop the 
point that Nixon was a great detail man w xo he spent about 20 minutes 
telling us about details that he recalled that the president had gotten 
·~ olved in, like the seating arrangement for a dinner, the guest 
ist, all social details, most of them, protocol details, things of 
hat nature, which he probably ought not to involve hims elf in, if hers 
ot a trust:fworthy staff but its something that interests him but if 
ohn Doar is instructing his witnesses that this is significant then 
0ohn Doar hasnrt got the picture of what the presidentts job is. Thatt 
kinda my reaction to it. But I can spend some time cause my notes are 
extensive going over those things if you think we can develop it later. 
